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Part 1: Principles and questions 
 
(A) Context/principles 
 
1. The third International Conference on Financing for Development will be held in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 13 to 16 July 2015, and takes place before the 21st 
session of the Conference of Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to be held in Paris, France, between 30 
November and 11 December 2015, which will include discussions about climate 
finance. The agreement on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) following the 
United Nations summit in 2000, and on finance at the first International Conference 
on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002, preceded any really 
effective climate finance discussions. However, there is clear and strong recognition 
in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are under preparation for the 
United Nations General Assembly in September 2015 in New York, of the importance 
of sustainability. Indeed the word “sustainable” appears in 11 of the 17 draft goals. In 
addition, the word “resilient” is used in connection with infrastructure and cities. 
Further, goal 13 (without the word sustainable) states explicitly “take urgent action to 
combat climate change and its impacts”. Thus negotiations about climate finance in 
Paris must be defined in the context of a very clear embodiment of climate and 
sustainability in the SDGs. 
 
2. The SDGs build on the MDGs, but, first, add great emphasis on sustainability, and, 
second, greatly strengthen the level of ambition on poverty reduction in all its 
dimensions. They take the fight against poverty into broader and deeper areas such 
as: ending poverty everywhere, lifelong learning, health at all ages, and so on. 
 
3. The challenges of development, growth, poverty reduction and sustainability are 
deeply and intricately interwoven with those of mitigation of and adaptation to climate 
change. It would be deeply damaging to try to treat them as separate entities for 
action and for finance. ‘Defining Paris relative to Addis’ must take this carefully into 
account. The different organisational tracks for the conference in Addis Ababa and 
the summit in Paris should be seen as an opportunity to complement and reinforce, 
not as a recipe for separation. Indeed, radical separation of finance for development 
and climate finance could be deeply damaging. It is a serious mistake to see action 
on climate and action on development as in conflict, or action on the former as a ‘plot’ 
to slow the latter. 
 
4. The overall figure of US$100 billion per annum by 2020 for climate finance is found 
in the Copenhagen Accord from COP15, which took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, 
in 2009, and embodied in the decisions of COP16 in Cancún, Mexico, in 2010. It is 
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now a political commitment and has to be embodied in, and interpreted as such, for 
Paris in 2015. 
 
(B )Questions for Climate Finance 
 
1. How should climate action, and finance for that action, be designed around SDG 
strategies and finance, in order to foster the strongest "climate boost” relative to other 
SDG actions/finance, whilst, at the same time, enhancing development effects? 
 
2. What meanings can be attached to "additionality" of climate finance relative to 
development finance? 
 
3. How large should the Paris climate finance objectives be? How much public and 
private? 
 
4. How should flows of different kinds be counted, in particular towards the 
US$100bn that has been committed to dedicated climate finance? 
 
These questions are clearly inter-related and all are relevant for the Paris 
discussions. 
 
Part 2: Some answers 
 
The scale/ambition of, areas of, and nature of, SDG activities will all influence the 
answers to these questions. As noted, climate goals are now fully embedded in the 
SDGs, as they should be, given the inter-relations between actions on development 
and climate. The ambition for development and climate outcomes embodied in the 
SDGs has implications for the scale of financing requirements from all sources. 
There are relatively limited ‘free-standing’ climate actions (with their associated 
financing requirements) in the sense of actions which are motivated only by ‘climate’ 
and not by ‘development’. The bulk of the financing requirements are embedded in 
financing needs for low-carbon infrastructure and non-infrastructure activities. At 
present, other than China and a few other exceptions, the world is under-investing in 
infrastructure, especially in developing countries where there are the largest unmet 
needs. And much of the investment that is taking place is neither low-carbon nor 
climate resilient. We should also recognise that, at least in some areas, the 
investment that is seen as low cost, in current market conditions and without 
appropriate pricing for externalities, is high-carbon-intensive and, similarly, that low-
carbon-intensive investment can be seen as high cost (not taking into account 
ancillary benefits that often accrue nationally). In this sense, the greater the 
investment of this type, the greater the opportunity and need for complementary 
finance for low-carbon. We should note also that some important activities for 
development would have less scope for complementary climate finances, for 
example education. 
 
Question 1 
 
A key emphasis and driving concept is how to find climate actions and finance (Paris) 
which give powerful climate contributions or boosts in the context of SDG finance 
decisions (Addis). There is, and should be, substantial logical and practical 
simultaneity in these decisions, but it helps to think of the climate decisions in the 
context of the SDG decisions. 
 
The climate actions and their finance should be designed to complement (take 
advantage of and intensify) the climate aspects of the development decisions. And 
they should be designed to be additional, in some sense (see next section). It is well-
designed complementarity and additionality which can combine to give a powerful 
climate boost from decisions at the Paris summit in relation to the conference in 
Addis Ababa. 
 
Question 2 
 
Additionality of climate finance can be understood in four ways. In all four we should 
recognise the close links between actions on climate, poverty reduction and 
development. 
 
(i) Programmes or projects that would not have come about without the climate 
finance. This is a standard use of the term additionality in development banks, e.g., 
EBRD. Examples could be programmes to protect tropical rain forests or to build sea-
walls to protect against climate-related storm surges would fall into this category. 
 
(ii) The finance stimulates action in areas which would not otherwise be covered or 
financed adequately. In particular the role of targeted climate finance is to ensure that 
the trillions of dollars of investment in infrastructure and non-infrastructure activities 
are as well-designed, efficient and low-carbon as they can be in a carbon-
constrained world. In this, the additionality comes from stimulating the right policy 
choices to foster such investment and through helping to put together viable overall 
financing packages in order to improve the financial risk-return performance of low-
carbon versus high-carbon investments, and bring market returns closer into line with 
economic returns. 
 
(iii) Mobilising new sources of financing that would not otherwise have been 
forthcoming or available, such as a slice of carbon tax revenue, flows via the Clean 
Development Mechanism, and new climate-dedicated expansions of multilateral 
development banks (MDBs). This was the approach adopted in the work of the 
United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate 
Financing, which reported in 2010. 
 
(iv) A scale of overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) resources for climate 
action which is additional to what has been previously committed to development. 
There are important ethical and economic arguments that indicate that a stronger 
understanding of the actions necessary to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
should make rich countries more ready to provide additional concessional finance. 
However, (see next section) it is inherently difficult to assess such additionality 
against a benchmark of what has been committed for development. 
 
There is some overlap between (i) and (ii), but (i) highlights projects in given sectors 
or areas which would not otherwise come about, and (ii) focuses on low-carbon 
strategies that would be otherwise under-emphasised and not adequately financed. 
 
The last of the four is very hard to nail down because development and climate 
actions are so intertwined in many areas, and because it is so hard to answer the 
question "what total resources would have been made available under ODA in some 
year (say, 2025) if we had never heard of climate change?" We can probably say that 
the readiness to provide ODA will have been increased with the recognition of 
climate change as a problem because (a) development has become more difficult 
and (b) the donor gains from climate action in another country. But how much such 
an increase might be is extremely difficult to understand or measure. Some have 
argued that the ODA committed for climate must be additional to the 0.7 percent 
target of GNI of rich countries that had been previously committed at Monterrey in 
2002. But how to assess this is problematic given that the 0.7 percent is not binding 
and has not been realised for most donor countries. Understanding of additionality in 
terms of (i) (ii) and (iii) seems to be more fruitful than (iv). Indeed, the fourth route is 
likely to generate confused and unproductive discussions. However, it is important to 
continue to stress the importance of adequate levels of ODA and concessional 
climate finance, and the moral case for intensifying development and climate 
assistance in the face of the great challenges posed by the threats of climate change. 
 
Hence there are the following propositions for areas of climate finance and action. 
 
(1) Promoting low- or lower-carbon activity in relation to infrastructure that may be 
under-emphasised in the agreement in Addis Ababa. That would include, in 
particular, lowering the cost of capital (important for scale, and for renewables and 
public transport, both of which are relatively capital intensive). This would play an 
important role in helping ‘affordability’ (both for scale of action and for poorer people) 
in the context of major investment programmes. Additional climate finance is 
particularly important for the poorest countries where affordability and access to 
capital markets is a major issue, but will be relevant for some middle-income 
countries too since the bulk of overall mitigation efforts must be there (this is where 
the big carbon-intensive investments would be without action to move towards low-
carbon). 
 (2) Promoting low-carbon activities, including energy efficiency, in non-infrastructure 
activities for buildings, transport, industry, agriculture, etc. 
 
(3) Adaptation, particularly for the most vulnerable and poorest countries. 
 
(4) Avoiding deforestation, more productive land use, and protection of fragile 
resources, including oceans and biodiversity. 
 
(5) Innovation and breaking new ground for climate action, including novel ways for 
the public and private sectors to work together (e.g. carbon capture and storage or 
climate-resilient agriculture). Recall the ‘green revolution’ for wheat and rice in the 
1970s where much of the action was in local agricultural research and extension. 
Innovation should be cross-cutting and everywhere, but a direct focus would also be 
very valuable given how critical it is and the need for fitting into country contexts. 
 
(6) Regional action: many climate actions for both adaptation and mitigation are 
regional in nature but at the moment are under-supported and under-funded. 
 
(3), (4) and (5) represent programmes that would not come about without targeted 
climate finance, whereas (1,) (2) and (6) are areas for catalytic support based on the 
idea of additionality relative to the emphases within SDG action. Thus they come 
from asking what are the areas of action relevant for climate, which are least likely to 
be within (or ‘under-emphasised’ in) the SDG set of actions. In a sense, we are 
identifying the set of climate actions least likely to overlap with ‘development’ actions. 
We know the overlap and interweaving is very strong, but it is not total. 
 
Question 3 
 
Scale. It is hard to invent an ‘appropriate level’ for climate flows. It is not clear how 
that would be defined, both in terms of its relationship to finance for the SDGs and in 
terms of ‘obligations’ of rich countries. It is probably best to stick with the 
Copenhagen/Cancun US$100bn p.a. by 2020 as an historical agreement from the 
UNFCCC processes which balanced a number of considerations and which is an 
agreement that should be honoured. Then we can discuss flows within it and how 
they should be counted (as next section). 
 
Question 4 
 
What counts. One can count finance arising from (1)-(6) as they have been selected 
to cover areas less likely to be fully covered within the SDGs. 
 
ODA finance for these areas should be fairly clear. MDB finance could, and perhaps 
should, be counted as a separate stream, since these flows are ‘public’ but usually 
involve strong loan elements (rather than being mainly grants). One could use 
multipliers for ‘ODA-equivalence’ if desired (with e.g. a higher multiplier for IDA-like 
finance). 
 
Private finance should be counted when it is clearly triggered by ODA or MDB 
finance and action. In other words, we should count private finance that is generated 
in part by external assistance. 
 
Part 3: Creating numbers 
 
The above has identified 6 areas for the negotiations on climate finance for the Paris 
summit. There are four types of finance relevant here: domestic resource 
mobilisation (taxes etc.) or DRM; ODA and other sources of concessional flows; 
other public flows, including MDBs; and private international flows. Thus one can 
imagine a 6 by 4 matrix of flows with different kinds of finance going to each of the 
above six activities. If an activity is a row, then the proportions of different kinds of 
finance are likely to vary across rows. 
 
Such a matrix could be constructed for different groups of countries: poorest or low-
income developing countries (LIDCs), lower-middle income, middle-middle income 
countries. 
 
There would be a corresponding set of matrices for the finance from the Addis Ababa 
conference. Some of the rows might overlap but there would be important 
differences. For example a key Addis-type of activity would be education, which 
would not appear directly in the rows of the Paris matrix. 
 
In thinking about the scale and nature of climate finance for the Paris summit, it 
should be clearly recognised that overall infrastructure finance for emerging markets 
and developing countries could be of the order of US$3 trillion per annum in the next 
decade or so. It is important to see climate finance for the Paris summit, at US$100 
billion per annum as catalytic in this context, rather than ‘gap-filling’. 
 
There is considerable work that is needed to flesh out a systematic framework and 
assess the required magnitudes and sources of financing. The work should also 
examine implications for institutions and instruments in ways that could enhance 
overall investment flows, thereby enabling SDG and climate objectives. 
 
